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1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Vagueness in Questions 
 
Following Merin’s (1999) approach to relevance, van Rooy (1999) uses Decision 
Theory (DT) to give a formal definition of relevance in its application to 
questions.  In his analysis, questions are inherently underspecified or vague (1): 
their denotation contains a variable Op (1b) that depends on a decision problem 
facing the speaker (i.e., the questioner). In the context of the decision problem, 
vagueness is resolved: a partition is chosen as the true import of the question (1d). 
 
(1)  Vagueness in questions: granularity 
  a.  Where do you live?  
 b.  {λv[g∈Op(P)(v)]:w∈W&g∈Op(P)(w)}, P=λwλx.You live in x in w 
  c.  Possible partitions:    
    i.{You live in USA, You live in France,…}     
    ii.{You live at 1 Sue St. Enid OK, You live at 2 3
rd St. Lodi NJ …} 
d.   Goal 1: Questioner interested in background of hearer     partition i 
  Goal 2: Questioner has to mail hearer a package     partition ii 
 
  The DT approach derives two main types of vagueness: level of 
granularity as in (1), and degree of exhaustivity (2), where the desired answer 
could be strongly exhaustive (mention-all) or mention-some. 
 
(2)  Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? 
 
1.2.  Vagueness in Plurals 
 
Striking parallels exist between the types of vagueness inherent in questions and 
those in definite plurals. First, as repeatedly noted in the literature, definite plurals  
are vague with respect to the level of granularity (distributivity) (3).  
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M. Gibson and J. Howell (eds), SALT XVI 120-137, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. (3)  a.  The boys built a raft.    
 b.  Possible  interpretations:   
    i. Team1={Andy,Bill} built a raft and Team2={Chris,Dan} built a raft 
    ii.Andy built a raft & Bill built a raft & Chris built a raft & Dan… 
 
  Second, definites are vague with respect to exhaustivity: (4) is compatible 
with the maximal (all the windows) or non-maximal construal of the definite, e.g. 
excepting a few closed windows if the hearer is wondering if his home is storm-
proof (Krifka 1996).  
 
(4)  a.  The windows are open.  
  b.  Possible interpretations:  i. All of the windows are open  
            ii. Some of the windows are open 
 
  In resolving the vagueness, what factors affect the final interpretation for 
sentences with definite plurals? First, the nature of the VP plays a role. Many 
predicates require a certain level of distributivity or collectivity in the subject NP 
(5a,b) (Dowty 1987), while others seem to produce a preference for maximal (5c) 
or non-maximal (5d) interpretation (Yoon 1996).  
 
(5)  a.  The boys took a deep breath 
  b.  The boys surrounded the castle 
  c.  The children are healthy 
  d.  The children are sick 
 
  While the VP clearly plays a role, it doesn’t fully determine the final 
interpretation – extra-linguistic factors play a role in resolving the vagueness in 
both distributivity and maximality.  Schwarzschild 1991 notes the influence of the 
extra-linguistic situation on distributivity with (6a, from Schwarzschild 1991); 
Krifka (1996) shows the effect of context over-riding Yoon’s observation on VP 
influence with (6bc, from Krifka 1996).  
 
(6) a.  Situation: Vegetables arrive at a grocery pre-packaged in baskets.  
    The grocery has a big rough scale suitable for small truckloads,  
    and a small scale for weighing only a few veggies or fruits at a time. 
   Utterance: The vegetables are too light for the big scale and too heavy  
    for the small scale 
 b.  Situation: I am about to travel, and want to ensure my house is safe in  
   my  absence. 
   Utterance: I returned to the house because I thought I had left the  
   windows/doors  open 
 c.  Situation: The local bank has a safe that is accessible only through a  
    hallway with three doors, all of which must be open to reach the safe. 
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To refine these observations, note that every scenario in (6) describes, 
first, an actual salient arrangement of the entities within the NP into ‘packages’ 
(veggies pre-packaged in baskets, windows on the outside of the house, doors in a 
sequence), and also the goals of conversational participants, as spelled out in (7). 
 
(7) a.  Utterance: The veggies are too light for the big scale.   
          (excludes collective interpretation) 
   Packaging: Vegetables arrive at a grocery pre-packaged in baskets. 
   Goal 1: To double-check the amount delivered    Utterance False 
   Goal 2: To price veggies for sale in baskets          Utterance is True 
 b.  Utterance: The windows are open 
   Packaging: The house has a dozen windows in its outside. 
   Goal 1: To prepare the house for the arrival of window-frame painters  
             All windows 
   Goal 2: To ensure the house is rain-proof before a thunderstorm 
             Some windows 
 
The empirical data thus indicates the conditions for a theory of 
interpretation of definite plurals. First, such a theory needs a vague or 
underspecified semantics that allows for the full range of the 
collective/distributive and maximal/non-maximal variation. Second, we need a 
way to encode the effects of the VP, the packaging of entities within the NP 
denotation, and the speaker/hearer goals in computing the truth-conditions. 
The idea that both packaging and speaker/hearer goals play a role in 
determining interpretation of definite plurals is fairly uncontroversial. Existing 
accounts, however, have either not spelled out the role of extra-linguistic factors, 
or focused on the role of packaging. 
In the next section, I will sketch three promising approaches to 
distributivity and maximality in definite plurals, and point to the need for an 
upgraded account. 
 
 
2.  Existing Approaches 
 
2.1.  Landman 1989 
 
Building on the work of Link (1983), Landman (1989) offers a semantic theory 
that permits varying levels of distributivity and (non)maximality.  He uses the star 
(*) operator to pluralize VPs, creating distributive interpretations, and permits 
predicates to distribute over sums of individuals (a⊔b⊔c), but not over groups 
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instances of collective predication (where the plural is interpreted as a group). 
Thus, the interpretations for the sentences in (5ab,6bc) would arise from 
representations in (8), in a situation where Andy, Bill, Chris, and Dan are the 
boys, and d1,…d5 are the doors (or windows) (following the arrow I include a 
simplified formula that indicates more precisely a situation in which the 
interpretation is true). Note that the only way to require a fully maximal 
interpretation is to make it fully distributive (8d). 
 
(8)  a.  [[ 5a]] = [[ The boys took a deep breath]]  = 
   =  λw.∃e*TOOK.A.DEEP.BREATH(e,w)&*Ag(e)= σx *boy(x,w)   
     (a⊔b⊔c⊔d) ∈ *TOOK.A.DEEP.BREATH(w)         distributive 
  b.  [[ 5b]] = [[ The boys surrounded the castle]]  =  
   =  λw.∃e*SURROUNDED.THE.CASTLE(e,w)&*Ag(e)= ↑σx*boy(x,w)   
     ↑(a⊔b⊔c⊔d) ∈ SURROUNDED.THE.CASTLE(w)  collective 
  c.  [[ 6b]] = [[ The doors are open]] =   
   =  λw.∃e*OPEN(e,w) & *Ag(e)= ↑σx *door(x,w)      
     ↑(d1⊔d2⊔d3⊔d4⊔d5) ∈ OPEN(w)
1       collective 
  d.  [[ 6c]] = [[ The doors are open]]  =   
   =  λw.∃e *OPEN(e,w) & *Ag(e)= σx door*(x,w)    
     (d1⊔d2⊔d3⊔d4⊔d5) ∈ *OPEN(w)     distributive 
 
It is not clear whether Landman’s original 1989 theory allows for the 
intermediate-distributive interpretations like (6a), repeated below.  
However, his 1996 paper explicitly derives them via adaptation of 
Schwarzschild’s 1991 proposal described below in section 2.3 and exemplified in 
(8e), where artichoke, Brussels sprout, cauliflower, daikon, and endive are the 
vegetables.  The definition of ‘cover-agent’ 
cAg(e) is given in section 2.3. 
 
(8)  e.  [[ 6a]] = [[ The vegetables are too light for the big scale]]  =  
   =  λw.∃e *TOO-LIGHT(e,w) & 
cAg(e)= ↑σx veg*(x,w)    
     (↑(a⊔b) ⊔ ↑(c⊔d⊔e))∈*TOO-LIGHT(w) intermediate-distributive 
 
                                                 
1I am allowing here, counter-intuitively, that predicates like ‘open’ or ‘take a breath,’ do not 
have a built-in lexical requirement that they must distribute fully down to individuals. Then, 
Landman 1989 and 1996 can derive non-maximal interpretations for ‘open’ (or ‘take a breath’) by 
giving the windows or doors a collective responsibility for the state of being open. If instead we 
say that selectional requirements of ‘open’ and ‘take a breath’ demand full distributivity, then 
neither Landman 1989 nor the theory described in section 2.3 below can derive non-maximal 
readings, and a pragmatic mechanism is necessary, like the one in Brisson 1998 or the one I 
propose below. 
 
(Non)maximality and Distributivity 123Landman’s theory posits a pervasive ambiguity between singular and plural VPs, 
and does not distinguish between the maximal and non-maximal interpretations in 
the representation (cf. 8b and 8c).
2  
Even more importantly for us, as can be seen from (8), the theory does not 
provide an explanation of how and when the various interpretations arise, since it 
does not include an account of pragmatic factors (whether the structure of a 
situation or the intent of a conversational agent). 
 
2.2.  Schwarzschild (1991) and Brisson (1998) 
  
Schwarzschild (1991) proposes an account of distributivity, focusing on spelling 
out the role of packaging by building a free variable over covers (Covi) into the 
denotation of VPs, which allows them to distribute up to sub-pluralities of the 
definite plural given by the cover.  A cover is defined in (9a); the specific cover in 
(9b) derives the intermediate-distributive interpretations (6c, 9c) from the 
representation in (9d).  
 
(9)  a.  Cover: a set of sets of entities, such that the union of the sets in the  
    cover is the universe of discourse. 
 b.  {{arti1,arti2,Br.sprout1,Br.sprout2},{caulif,daikon,endive},{John…}} 
  c.  The vegetables are too heavy for the big scale and too light for the  
   small  scale 
 d.  ∀x[x∈[[Cov i]]&x⊆[[the.veg']] x⊆[[too.heavy.for.sc1&too.light.for.sc2']] ] 
 
Brisson (1998) builds on Schwarzschild (1991) to permit exceptions by 
allowing mismatch between the distribution of individuals into the cover-cells and 
the NP denotations (ill-fitting covers (defined in 10a)).  
Unlike Landman (1989), she only derives cases of a few salient 
exceptional items (10c, from representation in 10d), rather than existential 
interpretations like (6b, 7b-2). 
 
(10)  a.  A cover is ill-fitting with respect to an NP denotation if some members  
    of NP denotation are in the same cover-cell as non-members, so no  
    union of cells in the cover equals the NP denotation. 
 b.  {{windw1},{windw2},{windw3},{windw4},{windw5,Mary, door}} 
  c.  The windows are open (but we didn’t get to the bathroom window yet) 
 d.  ∀x[x∈[[Cov i]]&x ⊆[[the.windows']]   x⊆[[open']] ] 
 
There are serious drawbacks in the cover-based account.   
                                                 
2This inability to distinguish between maximal and non-maximal interpretations in theory 
matches empirical data for collective predicates: since the plural agent bears collective 
responsibility for the action, we cannot distinguish whether all or some of the agent’s subparts 
actually participated. 
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into cover-cells, making non-maximality essentially a matter of narrowing the 
domain to a relevant set.  In this, the cover-based account of Brisson 1998 inherits 
the problem of any theory that derives non-maximality through domain 
narrowing. 
In fact, as examples (6b, 7b) repeated below (11) demonstrate, non-
maximality is not a matter of domain selection of any kind: there is no “relevant 
set” of open windows, and no window is more relevant than any other – it is 
simply irrelevant which or how many windows are open, as long as some of them 
are. This problem is intrinsic in the cover-based approach, and derives incorrect 
interpretations for many non-maximal uses of definite plurals. 
 
(11)  Scenario: The house has a dozen windows on the outside.  The hearer and  
speaker are going on a trip and want to make sure the house is safe. 
Utterance: The windows are open 
Cover-derived interpretation: The relevant/salient windows are open 
Actually: Some of the windows are open (it doesn’t matter which ones,  
and the speaker may not know which ones) 
 
Second, the distribution of individuals into cover-cells is denoted by a 
free, deictic variable, whose denotation is fixed when a particular cover is made 
salient in preceding discourse or extra-linguistic context. This deictic nature of 
Covi requires at least the speaker to know the exact composition of cover-cells, 
including the special cell containing exceptions, in the same way this is required 
for a pronoun.  
This is strikingly contrary to fact: the speaker doesn’t need to know the 
identity of the vegetables for the intermediate distributivity interpretation to arise 
in (6c, 9c), nor does he need to know the identity of the exceptional windows for 
the non-maximal interpretation to obtain in (4, 6b, 7b). 
One way to avoid making demands on speaker knowledge is to 
intensionalize the Covi variable, varying the distribution of individuals into cells 
with each possible world compatible with what the speaker knows.  As Kratzer 
(2003) notes, “amending Schwarzschild’s account of plural predication, we would 
want to say that plural predication depends on contextually provided cover 
functions, not just on contextually provided covers.” 
In terms of the needs outlined in the previous section, the cover account 
derives (at least some of) the influence of the VP (since the Covi variable is part 
of the VP) and of the “packaging” aspect of scenarios (whenever context provides 
a salient cover that yields correct interpretation), but does not have a mechanism 
for integrating the influence of speaker/hearer goals into the analysis. 
 
 
 
(Non)maximality and Distributivity 1252.3.  Landman (1996) and His Recasting of Schwarzschild (1991) 
 
In his wide-reaching article “Plurality”, Landman (1996) provides a recasting of 
Schwarzschild’s 1991 proposal in his own framework (what he dubs ‘Theory IV’ 
of plurality).  This is done by allowing cover roles, defined as in (12a), and 
illustrated in the proof (12d) for the denotation (12c) for the sentence (12b), in a 
situation where Andy, Bill, Chris, and Dan are the boys (compare with 6c, 9c).  
 
(12) a.  Definition: Let R be a thematic role. Then 
cR, the cover role based on  
    R, is the partial function from De (domain of events) into Dd (domain  
    of individuals) defined by  
  
cR(e) = a iff a∈ATOM & ⊔({↓(d) ∈SUM: d∈AT(*R(e))})=↓(a) 
   Paraphrase: a is either a singular atom or a group, and the set  
   underlying  a is the union of the elements underlying  atomic subparts  
    of the plural role based on R. 
  b.  The boys built a raft  (in a situation where there are two teams of boys) 
 c.  λw.∃e *BUILT.A.RAFT (e,w) & 
cAg(e)= ↑σx *boy(x,w)    
          λw.↑(a⊔b)⊔↑(c⊔d)∈*BUILT-A-RAFT(w) 
 d.  e=f⊔g, Ag(f)=↑(a⊔b), Ag(g)=↑(c⊔d); then *Ag(e)= ↑(a⊔b)⊔↑(c⊔d) 
   { ↓(d): d∈AT(*R(e))} = {a⊔b , c⊔d}, and ⊔({↓(d):d∈AT(*R(e))})= 
   =  ⊔({a⊔b,c⊔d})=a⊔b⊔c⊔d=↓(↑σx *boy(x,w))     q.e.d. 
 
The cover roles are a very powerful mechanism: using them, we can derive the 
interpretations in (5ab, 6abc) in a similar way (13). 
 
(13)  a.  [[5a]]  = [[ The boys took a deep breath]]  = 
   =  λw.∃e *TOOK.A.DEEP.BREATH(e,w) & 
cAg(e)= σx *boy(x,w)  
   e=f⊔g⊔h⊔i, Ag(f)=a, Ag(g)=b, Ag(h)=c, Ag(i)=d,   
   then  *Ag(e)=a⊔b⊔c⊔d, so ⊔({↓(d):d∈AT(*R(e))})= 
   = ⊔({a,b,c,d})=a⊔b⊔c⊔d=↓(↑σx  *boy(x,w))    q.e.d. 
  b.  [[ 5b]]  = [[ The boys surrounded the castle]]  =  
   =  λw.∃e *SURROUNDED.THE.CASTLE(e,w) & *Ag(e)= ↑σx *boy(x,w) 
    e is atomic, *Ag(e)=↑(a⊔b⊔c⊔d), so ⊔({↓(d):d∈AT(*R(e))})= 
   =  ⊔({a⊔b⊔c⊔d})=a⊔b⊔c⊔d=↓(↑σx *boy(x,w))    q.e.d. 
  c.  [[ 6b]]  =  [[ The doors/windows are open]]  =  
   =  λw.∃e *OPEN(e,w) & *Ag(e)= ↑σx *door(x,w)  (see footnote 1) 
    e is atomic, *Ag(e)=↑(d1⊔d2⊔d3⊔d4⊔d5), so ⊔({↓(d)}) = 
   = ⊔({d1⊔…⊔d5})= d1⊔d2⊔d3⊔d4⊔d5=↓(↑ σx *door(x,w))  q.e.d. 
  d.  [[ 6c]]  =  [[ The doors are open]]  =  
   =  λw.∃e *OPEN(e,w) & *Ag(e)= σx door*(x,w)  
   e=f⊔g…⊔j, Ag(f)=d1,…Ag(j)=d5, so *Ag(e)=(d1⊔d2⊔d3⊔d4⊔d5) 
   so  ⊔({↓(d) })=⊔({(d1,…,d5)})=d1⊔…⊔d5=↓(↑ σx *door(x,w)) q.e.d. 
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theory, allowing for the intermediate-distributive interpretations like (6c, 9c, 12d).  
Representation no longer contains the free, deictic variable Covi.  
On this approach, the speaker only has to know that there is a cover 
making the statement true (i.e.,  the speaker must only be sure of the existence of 
a proof like the one in (12b), where knowledge that the teams are boy-made will 
point to the existence of such a proof).   
The resulting analysis allows the full range of empirically attested 
interpretations, and says nothing about the way these various interpretations are 
derived and the factors that influence the derivation.   
Sentences like (14) just mean that subparts of the given group of 
windows/boys, in some packaging, are agents for (potentially plural) states of 
being open / events of raft-building.  
 
(14)  a.  The windows are open 
  b.  The boys built a raft 
 
This semantics is very weak. The only information transmitted with the use of a 
cover-role is that there exists some proof like the ones in (12, 13) – so, this 
incorrectly predicts that in a situation (6c), repeated below (15), the speaker can 
say  The doors are open on the collective interpretation (13c), allowing some 
doors to be actually closed, since a proof exists as long as some doors are open. 
 
(15)  Scenario: The hearer works in a bank and must get to a safe that can only  
  be reached via three consecutive doors. 
  Utterance: The doors are open 
  Interpretation allowed in Theory IV: Some/All of the doors are open 
  Actual interpretation: All of the doors are open 
 
This is much less information than would actually be transmitted by such an 
utterance in the situation (15). 
Similarly, this account incorrectly predicts that in a situation from (6a), 
repeated below in (16), the speaker can truthfully utter ‘The vegetables are not too 
light for the big scale’ on the collective interpretation, even when the baskets are 
actually too light for the scale. After all, the possibility of putting all the baskets 
on the scale at once points to the existence of some way to make the sentence 
true. 
 
(16)  Scenario: The vegetables arrive to the grocery store pre-packaged in  
  baskets, and need to be priced by weight. The store has a scale suitable for  
  only for truckloads of stuff. 
  Utterance: The vegetables are not too light for the big scale 
Interpretation allowed in Theory IV: The veggies, possibly weighed all  
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Actual interpretation: The veggies, weighed by the basket, are not too  
light for the big scale. 
  
Thus, by getting rid of the deictic cover variable, we have lost crucial 
information in this case. 
While clearly too weak to stand on its own, this semantics is the perfect 
starting point for an account drawing on pragmatic factors to derive a stronger 
interpretation – after all, in a particular scenario (6, 7), hearers are perfectly clear 
on whether all or some windows/doors are required to be open, and on which 
packaging is meant when baskets of vegetables need to be weighed. 
 
2.4.  Interim Conclusions 
 
In a theory of definite plurals, we must take into account that in accounting for the 
influence of packaging on  interpretation, deixis to packaging is necessary in 
some cases (e.g., 6a,16) – without it, the semantics is too weak (15, 16). At the 
same time, deixis to packaging is wrong in some cases (6b, 11) – because it 
makes non-maximality a matter of domain selection, and so the interpretations 
derived using it are contrary to fact. 
We still need to incorporate speaker/hearer goals into the analysis. 
In the proposal I lay out in the next section, I will introduce a deictic 
variable that will always include reference to hearer’s goals, and will  encode 
information about packaging only when such information is relevant to hearer’s 
goals. 
 
 
3.  Decision Theory Approach 
 
3.1.  The Proposal 
 
I apply Merin’s (1999) and van Rooy’s (1999) Decision Theory (DT) based 
definition of relevance to definite plurals, replacing the cover analysis, integrating 
Landman’s (1996) recasting of Schwarzschild’s proposal with a principled 
account of how and when the various interpretations arise.   
The chief innovation is thus the unification of the vague/flexible semantics 
with a formal analysis of pragmatic factors influencing the truth-conditions of 
sentences with definite plurals. 
Agents in conversation are constantly modeling each other’s goals. As a 
part of cooperative communication, each speaker aims to change the hearers’ 
states of knowledge so as to help them progress towards their goals. This is the 
heart of the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975), and in particular, of the Relation 
(Relevance) maxim.  
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definite plural), hearers select propositions which can influence their actions in 
achieving the goal.  Agents’ goals (and more) can be represented as decision 
problems (DeP) they are solving. A DeP is a triple <P,U,A>, where the 
probability function P represents agent’s beliefs, utility function U reflects the 
agent’s preferences, and a set of (mutually exclusive) actions A the agent chooses 
from.  
A proposition q changes agent’s beliefs (P), resolving the DeP if, after q is 
learned, a single action has, in each resulting world, the highest utility. In making 
an utterance, the speaker aims to resolve hearers’ DeP 
3.  
A relevance ordering between propositions (17) yields the contextual 
criterion for licensing and choosing an interpretation for plural definites, just as it 
does for questions, with relevance defined as helpfulness in resolving the DeP. 
 
(17) Proposition  p is more relevant (better to learn) for resolving DeP than q  
 ( p >DeP q) iff 
 i.  p eliminates more actions as non-optimal than q does or 
 ii.  p eliminates the same number of actions as q does, and q entails p  
  (i.e. q is over-informative) 
 
This relevance ordering, built into the definition of the variable REL (18)
4, allows 
the hearer to choose an appropriate interpretation for the vague definite. 
5 
 
(18)  The relevance operator: 
  a. Definition:  REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(w) =      
   {g:  ⊔{↓d: d∈AT(↓g)}⊆↓NP(w) & ¬∃h[⊔{↓d: d∈AT(↓h)}⊆↓NP(w)  
                  &[λw.VP(e,w)& 
*Ag(e)=h >DeP λw.VP(e,w)&
cAg(e)=g]]} 
                                                                                     __ 
   Paraphrase: REL is a function that takes the decision problem, VP  
    and NP denotations, and a world, and outputs a set of individuals g,  
    which could be groups or sums.  
The framed conjunct assures that when you boil g down to 
singularities, all of those singular individuals are atoms in the NP 
denotation (e.g., ‘the boys’).  
The second conjunct assures that no other such NP-made (e.g., boy-
made) thing h is more relevant than g – i.e., there is no h such that, as 
the underlined portion states, it’s better to learn that “h VPs”   than 
that “g VPs.” 
 
                                                 
3Or, rather, the speaker aims to resolve his/her estimate or hearer’s DeP.  While practically all 
linguists agree that conversational participants represent each other’s goals and knowledge during 
a conversation, the processes and representations utilized during such modeling are subject of 
much ongoing research. For the purposes of this paper and of (18), it is enough if speakers have 
an idea about the actions their hearers are choosing from, and can figure out the effect of learning 
various propositions on that action set.  
4REL for ‘relevant,’ instead of a similar variable Op proposed by van Rooy. 
5If x is an atom, ↓x=x (Landman 1989). If x a sum, rather than an atom, I assume  ↓x=x. 
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context-dependence. REL operator comes as part of the VP, following syntactic 
assumptions in Schwarzschild (1991) and preceding literature on distributivity 
(196c). The operator containing REL introduces a set of alternatives – ORel is a 
function from VP and NP denotations to the set of optimally relevant propositions 
(196a).  The sentential existential quantifier converts the set into a single 
proposition at the top. This last operation is the one introduced for the Hamblin 
semantics in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) (see also Keshet (this volume)). The 
schema for the entire sentence is given in (19).  
 
(19)  The relevance operator (continued): 
 a.  ORel = λw.λP.λq.λxλe. x∈REL(DeP)(P)(q)(w) & P(e,w)&*Ag(e,x) 
 b.  λw.∃p[p∈{λv.[g∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(v)&VP(e,v)&
*Ag(e)=g]:  
                    :g∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(w)} & 
p(w)=1] 
‘There is a true proposition, taken from the set of optimally-relevant  
propositions saying that some subpart(s) of the NP do the VPing.’ 
 c.  λw.∃p[p∈{λv.[g∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(v)&VP(e,v)&
*Ag(e)=g]:  
                    :g∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(w)} & 
p(w)=1] 
   ∃       IP = λw.λx.λe.x∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)(w)&VP(e,w)&*Ag(e,x) 
                
                       NPi  
VP=λw.λq.λx.λe.x∈REL(DeP)(VP)(q)(w)&VP(e,w)&*Ag(e,x) 
 
                              ORel    VP 
 
 
3.2.  Deriving (Non)Maximality 
 
I provide several worked-out examples to illustrate the schema in (19) in deriving 
maximal and non-maximal interpretations for definite plurals.
6  
  
(20)   a.  Decision Problem: Before a thunderstorm, Hearer has to decide  
    whether to go on with daily business (Action1) if all windows are  
    closed or return home (Action2) if some windows are open. 
 b.  Utterance: The windows are closed= 
   =  λw.∃p[p∈{g(w)∈REL(DeP)(win)(clo)(w)&g(w) is closed} &p=1] 
 c.  Pool of propositions REL chooses from:   
   w1⊔w2⊔w3 is closed  ↑(w1⊔w2⊔w3) is closed 
   ↑(w1⊔w2)closed   ↑(w2⊔w3)closed   ↑(w1⊔w3)closed 
   ↑(w1⊔w2)⊔w3 is closed ...  
                                                 
6In (20), the propositions with a single strike-through don't resolve the DeP, and are 
eliminated by REL. 
130 Sophia A. Malamud   ↑(w1⊔w2)⊔↑(w1⊔w3) is closed… 
   w1⊔w2  closed    w2⊔w3 closed    w1⊔w3 is closed  
    w1 is closed       w2 is closed       w3 is closed  
 d.  Some possible interpretations:  
   ☺ i. ∃p[p∈{∃e.*clo(e)&w1+w2+w3+w4+w5=*Ag(e)}&p=1]      
        (all of the windows are closed) 
        ii. 
∃p[p∈{∃e*clo(e)&w1=*Ag(e),∃e*clo(e)&w2=*Ag(e),…}&p=1] 
            (some of the windows are closed) 
 
Consider an agent facing the problem in (20a). If he hears (20b), he has to 
select one of the interpretations [i] or [ii] as the true import of the vague literal 
statement. While [i] resolves the decision problem (by pointing to Action1), [ii] 
fails to do so, since it is compatible both with a scenario where all windows are 
closed, and one in which some are open and some closed. So, [i] is the only 
relevant interpretation. 
A built-in consequence of the framework is this: the only way to force a 
maximal interpretation is for REL to produce a single most-relevant proposition, 
so that the existential quantification over propositions is over a singleton set. 
Further, we inherit from Landman the fact that maximal interpretations are simply 
fully distributive ones, where a unique optimal proposition involves distributive 
predication over a sum.  
To illustrate what happens when these conditions fail to hold, consider the 
example in (21) below.
7 
 
(21)  a. Decision Problem: Hearer is preparing his house for arrival of 
painters, 
    who will paint all the window-frames. He has to decide if he can relax  
    till they arrive (Action 1), or if he still needs to do something to  
    prepare for the painters (Action 2). 
  b.  Utterance - same as in (20b): The windows are closed= 
   =  λw.∃p[p∈{g(w)∈REL(DeP)(win)(clo)(w) & g(w) is closed} &p=1] 
  c.  Pool of propositions REL chooses from (see footnotes 1, 5, 6, 7) 
   w1⊔w2⊔w3 is closed  ↑(w1⊔w2⊔w3) is closed 
   w1⊔w2 closed     w2⊔w3 closed       w1⊔w3 closed 
   ↑(w1⊔w2)closed   ↑(w2⊔w3)closed   ↑(w1⊔w3)closed 
    w1 is closed      w2 is closed        w3 is closed   
   ↑(w1⊔w2)⊔w3 is closed …       (w1⊔w2)⊔↑(w1⊔w3) is closed… 
  d.  Some possible interpretations: 
         i. ∃p [p∈{∃e.*clo(e)&w1+w2+w3+w4+w5=*Ag(e)} & p=1]               
                                                 
7Propositions with a double strike-through are over-informative and so are eliminated by 
REL. 
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   ☺ ii. ∃p[p∈{∃e*clo(e)&w1=*Ag(e),∃e*clo(e)&w2=*Ag(e),...}&p=1]  
        (some of the windows are closed) 
 
Consider an agent facing a different problem (21a).  If he hears the same 
utterance as before (20b, 21b), then both [i] and [ii] resolve the DeP (by pointing 
to Action2) and thus are both relevant. But [i] entails [ii] and thus is over-
informative (hence less relevant according to (17)). This points to [ii] as the 
intended message. 
Thus, whenever REL fails to winnow the set down to a single fully-
distributive proposition, the existential quantification over propositions will result 
in a weaker meaning, stating that one of the most-helpful propositions is true. In 
the case when the hearer doesn't care which windows are closed, all propositions 
stating that one of the windows is closed are equally most-helpful. Thus, the 
existential quantification over propositions creates the effect of existential 
quantification over the windows, i.e., the non-maximal reading. 
 
3.3.  Deriving Distributivity 
 
The worked example below illustrates that the hearer chooses the level of 
distributivity based on (17) in a (by now) familiar fashion. 
 
(22)  a.  Decision Problem: Hearer is deciding whether to pass the various  
    boys’ teams in a raft-building competition. Action1:pass Team1, fail  
    Team2. Action2: pass Team2, fail Team1. Action3: pass both,  
    Action4: fail both. 
  b.  The boys built a raft= 
   = λw.∃p[p∈{g(w)∈REL(DeP)(boys)(built)(w)&g(w)built a raft}&p=1] 
  c.  Pool of propositions REL chooses from: 
   a ⊔b⊔c⊔d built.raft  
   ↑(a⊔b⊔c⊔d)built≈Team1=↑(a⊔b⊔c⊔d)⊔Team2=↑(a⊔b⊔c⊔d)built 
   a ⊔b⊔c built.raft     a⊔b⊔d built.raft            …   
   ↑(a⊔b⊔c)built.raft ≈ Team1=↑(a⊔b⊔c)⊔Team2=↑(a⊔b⊔c) built.raft  
    …      
   ↑(a⊔b) built.raft  ≈ Team1=↑(a⊔b)⊔Team2=↑(a⊔b) built.raft … 
   a ⊔b built.raft  b⊔d built.raft   a⊔c built.raft …    
   a ⊔b⊔↑( c⊔d)built.raft…  ↑(a⊔b)⊔c⊔a built.raft … 
    a built.raft  ≈ Team1=a ⊔ Team2=a built.raft  
   b  built.raft  ≈ Team1=b ⊔ Team2=b built.raft 
   …   
   ↑(a⊔b)⊔↑( c⊔d) built.raft  ↑(a⊔c)⊔↑( b⊔d) built.raft  
   ↑(a⊔b⊔c)⊔d built.raft  
   ↑(a⊔b⊔c)⊔↑( c⊔d) built.raft …  
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        i. Andy built a raft & Bill did, & Chris&Dan (as a group) did too. 
   ☺ ii. Team 1 built a raft & team 2 built a raft. 
        iii. Andy built a raft & Bill did & Chris did & Dan did. 
 
Suppose that exact composition of the teams is not known (but it is known 
that there are two boy-made teams in the competition).  Interpretation [i] fails to 
resolve the question of the teams’ performance. Both the interpretations [ii] and 
[iii] resolve the problem, and so are relevant.  But [iii] is over-informative, and so 
[ii] is the interpretation of choice. 
The remaining propositions in the set represent the set of speaker’s 
epistemic possibilities, i.e., the speaker’s uncertainty about the composition of the 
teams.
8  In this framework, speaker’s uncertainty about the exact distribution of 
individuals into “packages” will prevent REL from eliminating the propositions 
that involve the correct level of distributivity. The existential quantification over 
propositions will then capture the speaker’s inability to choose among the 
remaining propositions.
9  
The framework also opens up a possibility of having non-maximal 
intermediate-level interpretations, impossible to derive in Landman 1989 or 
Theory IV (Landman’s 1996 recasting of Schwarzschild 1991). Empirically, such 
readings do arise sometimes. For instance, in an international soccer competition, 
where men’s and women’s teams from various countries compete, an observer 
can say "The African men won" to mean that some of the men’s teams from 
Africa won (say, Ghana and Tunisia), even if some lost (say, Togo). 
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
4.1.  Back to Questions 
 
The DT approach takes as its base a weak semantics for definite plurals, and 
builds in pragmatic factors to derive stronger truth-conditions for sentences with 
definites. Speakers’ estimates for each other’s beliefs, goals, and available actions 
are incorporated into selection of maximally relevant propositions with subparts 
of the plural definite (6, 7). The framework derives the (non)maximality and 
distributivity patterns and makes correct predictions about speaker knowledge. 
                                                 
8Thanks to Chris Potts for pointing this out. 
9In a more intensionalized framework, REL would output not the individuals (boys), but 
functions g(w) that, for each world, give correct “cover” (the two boys’ teams) in that world. The 
resulting set of propositions that remain after REL applies is then a singleton: {teams(w) 
built.raft}. It's not immediately clear if such system permits non-maximal intermediate-distributive 
readings. 
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questions (van Rooy 1999), where speakers’ estimates for each other’s Decision 
Problems are incorporated into selection of the set of maximally relevant answers.  
 
(24)   A.  Where do you live?  
 b.  {λv[g∈REL(place)(P)(v)]:w∈W&g∈REL(place)(P)(w)},  
   where  P=λwλxYou live in x in w 
 c.  Possible partitions:   i. {You live in USA, You live in France,…}  
            ii. {You live at 1 High St. Enid OK,…} 
 d.  Decision Problem1: Questioner interested in background of hearer to  
    select a conversation topic: US sports (Action1), French cuisine  
   (Action2),  … 
   Decision Problem2: Questioner has to mail hearer a package to  
    (actions corresponding to different addresses) 
 
(25)  a.  Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? 
 b.  {λv[g∈REL(place)(P)(v)]:w∈W&g∈REL(place)(P)(w)},  
   with  P=λw.λx.Italian newspaper sold at x in w 
 c.  Possible sets: i. {{u=It.news sold at the palace},{v=It.news sold at the  
                station},{w=It.news sold at the palace & the station}}  
             ii. {{u,w},{v,w}} 
   Decision Problem1: In Amsterdam, questioner wants to read news in 
Italian by buying the newspaper at the station (Action1), or at the 
palace (Action2) 
          Decision Problem2: In Amsterdam, questioner is surveying 
availability of Italian press for a travel website (actions corresponding 
to writing down different sets of places where Italian press is sold) 
 
In the same way as it does for plurals, this framework results in mention-all 
question interpretations when in each world, the optimally-relevant answers are 
singleton sets. Exactly when several answers are equally optimally-relevant, the 
REL will yield a mention-some interpretation for the questions. 
 
4.2.  Overt Distributivity and Maximality Operators 
 
Not all sentences with definite plurals are vague. Operators like all or each force 
maximal (and, in the case of each, fully distributive) interpretations in sentences 
with definite plurals (26), compare with (27).  
 
(26)  a.  All the boys surrounded the castle.    
  b.  The boys built a raft each.  
(27)  a.  The boys surrounded the castle.   
  b.  The boys built a raft. 
134 Sophia A. MalamudHow do these lexical items achieve this effect? Theoretically, two mechanisms 
are possible. First, the lexical operator (all or each) can work in the semantics to 
limit or change the available interpretations. Another possibility is for these 
operators to contribute information about extra-linguistic factors (affecting the 
Decision Problem), so that REL, as a result, will give the desired interpretations.   
Winter (1998, 2002) adopts the former approach to these operators, while 
Brisson (1998) pursues the latter. Empirical data suggests that no extra-linguistic 
factors can force a maximal interpretation in collective sentences like (27a). So, it 
cannot be that all affects the context to force a maximal interpretation in (26a).  
This is matched by inability of REL, on our account, to distinguish 
between maximal and non-maximal interpretations for collective predication. 
Thus, I adopt Winter’s approach, in which all (and each) work in the semantics to 
introduce universal quantification (and full distributivity) over atoms in the NP.  
In Winter’s (2002) framework NP and VP denotations can denote sets of 
atomic entities, or sets of sets of entities.  He defines all as a composite 
determiner dfit(every), where every has the usual denotation (a relation between 
sets of atomic entities), while dfit operation is defined as in (28). 
 
(28) Let  D be a relation between sets of elements in a domain E of atoms. The  
 operator  dfit (determiner fitting) maps D to a relation dfit(D) between sets  
  of sets of atoms in p(E), which is defined as follows:  
  For any two sets A, B ∈p(E), the relation (dfit(D))(A,B) holds iff the  
    relation D(∪A, ∪(A∩B) holds. 
 
Translating this to the notation used here (with groups and sums), and making this 
specific to all, we get (29a). Without REL, this would produce the denotation in 
(29b) for (26a). 
 
(29) a.  all  =  dfit(every) = λP.λQ. Every (⊔↓P, ⊔(↓P⊓↓Q))  
  b.  all the boys surrounded the castle = 
    = Every (σx.*boy(x), ⊔(σx.*boy(x)⊓ σx.surrounded.castle (x))) 
    = Every boy participated in a set of boys that surrounded the castle 
 
As in the case without all, REL will produce a set of propositions in the end 
(because of the type mismatch, combining via function combination, as before). 
This will be a singleton set.  Translating Winter’s framework to the notation used 
in this paper, with some adjustments we will get (30) 
 
(30)  λQ.Every (⊔↓NP, ⊔(↓NP⊓↓Q)) (λx. x∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)&VP(x)) = 
  = Every (⊔↓NP, ⊔(↓NP⊓({↓x: x∈REL(DeP)(VP)(NP)&VP(x)}))  
 
This results in the denotation for (26a) given in (31a) and paraphrased in (31b): 
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       x ∈REL(DeP)(sr.csl)(σx.*boy(x)&sr.csl(x))})) 
  b.  Every boy participated in a set of relevant boys that surrounded the  
    castle.   
 
Notice that (31b) is equivalent to (29b), except that (31b) can be taken to 
contribute an additional statement about the Decision Problem (namely, that the 
proposition with “all the boys” is optimally relevant). 
 
4.3.  Some Further Issues 
 
The Decision Theory approach, unifying the interpretation of interrogatives and 
definite plurals, lays the groundwork for explaining the parallel behavior of 
questions and plurals with respect to QVE (Lahiri 1991, 1998, Williams 2000, 
Beck and Sharvit 2002) (32). 
 
(32)  a.  For the most part, Al knows about which kids are drunk 
  b.  For the most part, Al hates the kids on his block 
  c.  For the most part, Al knows where the kids are hiding 
  
Quantification over parts can apply to wh-phrase denotations (32a) as well as to 
definite plurals (32b). Sometimes, it can apply to either, depending on the context 
(Williams 2000) (32c). A framework using similar mechanisms for interpreting 
definite plurals and wh-phrases is a prerequisite for addressing this data. 
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